Abstract -In the paper the approach for the simulation of counteraction between malefactors and defense systems in the Internet is considered. We try to model these antagonistic actors as software agents' teams. To simulate the teams' warfare it is proposed to use various computational models (from analytical and packetbased to virtual and testbeds). The main attention is drawn to the application of agent-oriented simulation based on the packet-based imitation of network security processes. Such approach provides acceptable fidelity and scalability in representing the attack and defense mechanisms. The approach is examined on an example of "Distributed Denial of Service" attacks and defense simulation. We consider differentphases of antagonistic teams' operations -learning, decision making and counteracting, including the adaptation of one team to the actions ofopposite team.
Introduction
Today we are the witnesses of growing dependence of all sides of our vital functions from the Internet and other information technologies. The further use of these technologies becomes impossible without an appropriate solution about adequate security mechanisms. The Internet is constantly influenced now by malefactors' attacks (viruses, worms, etc.). These attacks often succeed. So, the current state of counteraction between malefactors and defense systems can be characterized as "a game of network cats and mice" [19] . The malefactors-professionals to achieve their goals in a cyber-environment can use sophisticated strategies for the realization of different security threats. These strategies can contain a set of various actions: (1) Gathering necessary information, detection of vulnerabilities and applied defense tools; (2) Investigating methods to overcome defense; (3) Suppression, bypass or deception of defense systems; (4) Exploiting vulnerabilities and accessing resources, privilege escalation, and realizing threats; (5) Hiding the tracks of activity and creating "backdoors". Therefore, computer (1) Implementation of defense mechanisms that correspond to the defined security policy (including proactive attack prevention, malefactor disinformation, hiding and camouflage of important resources and processes, etc.); (2) Gathering and analysis of data about the state of computer system due to information processing from different sources; (3) Detection of anomaly activity, not legitimate actions, attacks and intrusions; (4) Prediction of intentions and possible malefactor actions; (5) Direct response to the intrusions, including malefactor's misleading due to false components to exposure and define his (her) goals; (6) Reflexive management of malefactor's behavior, reinforcement of critical defense mechanisms; (7) Elimination of intrusion consequences, discovered vulnerabilities and adaptation of defense system to further intrusions. Unfortunately the present theoretical basis for information security in large-scale systems does not allow researchers to formalize adequately the mentioned set of processes. Though the researchers can represent particular defense mechanisms, the understanding of security components as a holistic system is a very difficult task. This understanding depends on many dynamical interactions between particular security processes and cybercounteraction between different antagonistic elements. It is especially right, taking into account the present evolution of the Internet into decentralized distributed environment where a huge number of cooperating and antagonistic software agents exist and interact. Let us examine the problem of comprehensive investigation of information security processes on an example of warfare between malefactors (realizing one of the most critical classes of computer attacks -"Distributed Denial of Service" (DDoS)) and defense mechanisms against these attacks. To start DDoS attack a malefactor needs to compromise many hosts (zombies) to execute on them the Denial of Service software that is targeted to some victim hosts. The principal part of such attacks consists in sending to the victim a large amount of packets (UDP and ICMP flood, Smurf, Fraggle), too long packets (Ping of Death), the incorrect packets (Land), the large amount of laborious requests (TCP SYN), etc. [18] . The design and implementation of effective DDoS defense system is a very complicated problem. The effective defense includes the mechanisms of attack prevention, attack detection, tracing the attack source and attack protection. Adequate victim defense can only be achieved by the cooperation of different distributed components. So, the DDoS problem requires a distributed cooperative solution which involves a set of defense components [18] . Our goal is to suggest a common agent-based approach for the investigation and elaboration of defense methods and to produce well-grounded recommendations on the choice of defense mechanisms that are the most efficient in particular conditions. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 outlines the common approach for simulation. Section It is proposed to use a family of various models to research the processes of cybernetic counteraction. The choice of particular models depends on the necessary fidelity and scalability of modeling and simulation. For example, analytical models let imitate the global processes happening in Internet (for example, virus epidemics). But these models describe modeled processes only on an abstract level. Packet-level simulation gives the opportunities to imitate proceeding processes with high fidelity. It allows to represent the attack and defense actions as packet exchange which precisely specifies the functioning on data link, network, transport and application layers. The greatest fidelity is archived with the hardware testbed. But it succeeds in modeling the sufficiently limited fragments of agents' interactions. The approach realized in the paper is based on packetlevel simulation using tools for network processes imitation as basic level of the simulation environment. The following studies are used as the basis for the modeling and simulation of malefactors and defense systems counteraction in the Internet: agent-oriented simulation; agent teamwork; reasoning systems based on forecasting of opponent intentions and plans; reflexive processes; game theory; modeling and simulation of networks attacks; security processes modeling; adaptive systems and evolutionary computation. The main basis for the research is the agent teamwork theory. There are three well-known approaches to the formalization of the agent teamwork -joint intentions theory [4] , shared plans theory [10] and the hybrid approaches [12, 21] 25 ]. There were published the studies on determining the malefactor's plans during the intrusion detection [7, 8] . It is proposed to use the ideas of agent plans recognition on the basis of stochastic formal grammar recovery algorithms [9] . The important components in this research are the methods of reflexive processes theory [17] , game theory [3] and control in conflict situations [5] . Authors used the methods of agent actions scenario specification which are based on the stochastic attributive formal grammars [9] . These methods are correlated with the colonies of cooperative distributed grammars and grammar models of multi-agent systems [ 15] . The teams of malefactors and defense agents are to adapt to hardware and software reconfiguration, traffic changes and new types of defense and attacks on the basis of past experience. Therefore it is important to take into account the present studies in the area of adaptation and selflearning of agents [ 1, 11] . The approach for teamwork proposed in the paper is based on the joint use of the elements of joint intentions theory, shared plans theory and hybrid approach. The agent teamwork is assumed to be organized due to the shared plan of actions with the following features [16] : (1) The group plan demands the agent team to come to agreement to fulfill the set of given instructions; (2) Agents have to take the commitment relative not only to the individual actions but to the actions of other agents and to the actions of the whole group; (3) The plan of group activity might include the plans of individual agents for the given action and the subgroup plans; (4) During teamwork realization the agents have to achieve the agreement with the instructions due to communications. They also have to coordinate their intentions. The structure of agent team is described in terms of group and individual roles hierarchy. The leaves of hierarchy correspond to the roles of individual agents, the intermediate nodes -to the group roles. The specification of action plans hierarchy is made for every role. The following elements are defined for every plan: initial conditions, when the plan is offered for fulfillment; the conditions with which the plan stops being fulfilled; actions executed on the team level as a part of the shared plan. The joint activity is obviously expressed for the group plans. The team members have the shared mental model. Agents can create the "snapshots" of mental state of the whole team due to joint intentions on the different abstract levels. The hierarchy of intentions is defined jointly by the team members in order to achieve the common goal. It is the consequence of agent commitments with each other. The mechanisms of agent interaction and coordination are based on the three groups of procedures [21, 16] The mode is specified by the intensity of packet sending (packets per second) and the method of spoofing of sender IP address ("IP spoofing"). The method of spoofing may be as follows: (1) Without spoofing ("no") -the real address of host (where daemon is deployed) is used; (2) "Constant" -an address is randomly chosen, then it is used for sending the attack packets; (3) "Random" -with every new attack packet a new address from the given range of addresses is randomly chosen. This range does not intersect with the range of addresses used in the given network; (4) "Random real" -with every new attack packet a new address from the given range of addresses used in the network is randomly chosen. Malefactor can stop the attack giving to master the command "stop the attack". Master resends this command to daemons, and they stop the attack.
Defense agents
In accordance with general approach there were chosen the following defense agent classes [16] : initial information processing ("sensor"); secondary information processing ("sampler"); attack detection ("detector"); filtering ("filter"); investigation ("investigator"). 
Simulation environment
We developed our simulation environment using OMNET++ INET Framework [22] . The example of multi-window user interface of the simulation environment is depicted in Figure 1 . At the basic window of visualization (Figure 1 , at upper right), a simulated computer network is displayed. The window for simulation management (Figure 1 , at bottom right) allows looking through and changing simulation parameters. It is important that you can see the events which are very valuable for understanding attack and defense mechanisms on the time scale. The time scale is depicted above windows with the events description. Corresponding status windows (on top of Figure 1 , in the middle) show the current status of agent teams. It is possible to open different windows which characterize functioning (the statistical data) of particular hosts, protocols and agents, for example, at the bottom left of Figure 1 , the window of one of the hosts is displayed. At the basic window of visualization (Figure 2) The hosts are connected with the channels. Their parameters can be changed. They are as follows: "delay" -delay of packets propagation; "datarate" -the speed of packets transmission. During agent design and implementation there were used the elements of abstract FIPA architecture [6] . The main idea of such representation is to provide the interaction of agents and the ability of agents' reuse. Such system description gives the possibility to see the correlations between the main elements of agent-based system. There were used the following elements of the abstract architecture for the agents in the developed system: communication language, transport layer, agent directory. The implementation of interaction language is needed for all agents to let them transmit the messages. Agent directory is needed for the agents "master" and "detector" that coordinate the activity of agents in theirs teams. Daemon needs implementation of two transport components (for communications and attacks). The agent of filtering needs the implementation of network layer to let it apply filtering rules. Agents "sensor" and "sampler" are to have the network layer also to let them process and collect the data, for example, to create the model of normal traffic. Agents are deployed on the hosts in the simulation environment. Their installation is fulfilled by connecting to the modules serving the transport and network layers of protocol stack simulated in OMNeT++ INET Framework. Each network for simulation consists of three subnetworks: (1) the subnet of defense where the defense team is deployed; (2) the intermediate subnet where the standard hosts are deployed. They produce the generic (normal) traffic in the network including the traffic to defended host; (3) the subnet of attack where the attack team is deployed. The subnet of defense ( Figure 2 , the hosts highlighted with green) consists of five hosts. The following agents are deployed on the first four hosts: detector, sampler, filter and investigator. The web-server which is under defense is deployed on the fifth host. The agents and the web-server are the applications installed on the corresponding hosts. The IP addresses are being installed automatically. It is necessary to fix a set of other application parameters. Web-server is deployed on the host d srv. The interaction port and the answer delay must be set. Detector is deployed on the host d det. The following parameters are used for detector: the defended host IP address, the port for team interaction, the interval for sensor inquiry, and the maximum allowed data-rate to server (BPS, bit per second). Sampler is deployed on the host d firewall (on the entrance to the server subnet). Filter is installed on the host d r (router). Investigator is deployed on the host d_inv. For each of the last three agents, the private port, the IP address of detector and the port for team interaction must be set. The intermediate subnet (Figure 2 , not highlighted hosts) consists of N hosts i cli[ ...] with generic clients. They are connected by the router i r. The number of hosts N is the simulation parameter which can be set. The following parameters of clients must be specified: IP-address and port of server, the time of work start, the quantity and size of requests while connecting to server, the size of reply and the time of reply preparation, the idle interval. The subnet ofattack (Figure 2, The main task of learning mode is to create the model of generic traffic for the given network. The clients send the requests to the server and it replies. At this time sampler analyses requests and uses them to form the models and parameters for the SIPM, HCF and BPS methods. During the learning it is possible to watch the change of traffic models for each of discussed methods.
A the time of last request. As mentioned above the hop count is calculated on the basis of the TTL 1± packet field. Figure 4 hops to them after 300 seconds of learning Figure 3 represents the list of hosts that sent requests to server and hops to them after 300 seconds of learning and Figure 5 : list of clients requested server and considered as legitimate after 300 seconds of learning Simulation scenario is realized on the same configuration as was used for learning. The only difference is that the attack team is engaged now. Attack team initial parameters are as follows: target_ip="d_srv" (target of attack is server d srv); target_port="2001" (target port); t ddos=300 (time of attack start); attack rate=5 (intensity of attack in packets per second); ip_spoofing="no" (no IP spoofing is used).
After simulation start the clients begin to send requests to the server and it replies. This is the way the generation of generic network traffic takes place (Figure 8, interval 
